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The central banks of small open economies have to procure the
proper operation of the payments system for transactions with the
rest of the world. They do so facing the constraint of a limited stock
of international reserves. To make ends meet, they usually rely on
three instruments: the choice of an exchange rate regime, the regu-
lation of the foreign exchange transactions of commercial banks and
general exchange controls. Based on some stylized facts of the Mexican
experience of the past three decades, this paper uses a Simulinkr
model to show the e®ects of di®erent institutional constructs on some
key nominal variables. For a reasonable set of simulation parame-
ters, it shows that either the complete segmentation of the peso-dollar
market or a full integration of both markets are preferable to inter-
mediate arrangements that contemplate some form of partial ¯nancial
liberalization.
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1Introduction
The problem
The central banks of small economies have virtually an unlimited capacity
to help their own government and local banks to satisfy their short term
liquidity needs in the local currency. Unfortunately, those central banks
would have to rely on their stock of international reserves to extend credit in a
foreign currency to distressed banking institutions or to fund the government
in case of their failing to roll over debt.
From this perspective, the international reserves are not only needed to
defend a ¯xed or administered exchange rate, but also to respond to more
general shortages in foreign funding. Hence, the impact of domestic and
external shocks on the exchange rate, interest rates and country risk spreads
will depend on what the reserves are ultimately committed for.
To make ends meet, the authorities usually rely on three instruments:
the choice of an exchange rate regime, the regulation of the foreign exchange
transactions of commercial banks and general exchange controls.
It is certainly not unusual that under a ¯xed exchange rate regime, the
central bank would try to shield its reserves from shocks speci¯c to banks
o to certain sectors in the economy, by introducing some sort of exchange
controls. However, even when the exchange rate is allowed to °oat freely,
central banks may need to hold signi¯cant levels of international reserves to
be able to keep the payments system going in times of distress.
The Mexican Experience of the last three decades o®ers a good "one stop"
example of the kind of constructs of exchange rate regimes and formulas to
segment the foreign exchange market that can be seen in practice.1
In the 19700s, the authorities had in place a package that combined a
¯xed exchange rate regime 2 with virtually no restrictions to any form of
foreign exchange transactions. When the crisis of 1982 arose, the central
bank found itself without reserves to face the needs of the current account,
the government and the banks. Hence, Mexico devalued, defaulted on foreign
lenders and on domestic deposits denominated in dollars.
The policy response was to ¯x the exchange rate after the ¯rst round of
1For a more detailed account of what happened over these period on the foreign ex-
change market front, see Aspe [2], Blanco and Garber [3], and Ortiz [16]
2For the purposes of this paper, a crawling peg will be thought be equivalent to a ¯xed
exchange rate regime.
2devaluations, and to impose widespread exchange controls. The transactions
in the capital account were reduced only to direct foreign investment and
loans granted by international ¯nancial institutions.
In the early 19900s, as part of an economy-wide strategy of deregulation
and privatization, the exchange controls on ¯rms and the public were lifted.
Banks were allowed to borrow and lend in foreign exchange, but were not
allowed to take deposits from the public other than in pesos. In addition,
banks were required to match their overall holdings of assets and liabilities in
foreign exchange. During this time, the peso °oated within a rather narrow
band.
The crisis of 1994 required to use a large proportion of the reserves to
defend, for some time, the exchange rate; and later to lend the banks who
were unable to roll over their short term obligations. The central bank opened
for almost a year a dollar discount window. Banks drew close to US$4:0
billion during the ¯rst six months, out of an estimated US$10 billion in
interbank loans that were due in that same period.
The response to this new crisis was to let the peso °oat and to further limit
the foreign exchange transactions that banks could make. In fact, banks were
not only required to balance their dollar books, but to match their assets
and liabilities in foreign exchange by maturity dates.
Banks Public can
Banks can borrow hold US$ Generalized Exchange
Period can lend in US$ deposits in Capital Rate
in US$ from foreign local controls Regime
creditors banks
1970-76 no no no no Fixed
1976-82 yes yes yes no Crawling Peg
1982-91 no no no yes Crawling Peg
1991-94 yes yes no no Target zone
1995- yes yes no no Floating
Table 1: Institutional Arrangements in Mexico's Forex market
Six years into the operation of this package of rules, the debate on where
to move forward appears to be considering two main alternatives: on the one
hand, to further loosen the restrictions on banks by asking them to show a
long dollar position, or in other words, to require banks to have a part of
their capital denominated in dollars and earmarked to a balance sheet in
3dollars. The other initiative is far more aggressive. It consists on allowing
the operation of branches of foreign banks in the Mexican territory. They
would also be given the authorization to take deposits and make loans in any
currency.
The authorities may soon decide on the course of action to follow. In
doing so they will be conditioned by at least the following four facts:
² Since the collapse of the banking system in the aftermath of the 1994-
95 crisis, most institutions have changed hands in favor of foreign own-
ers. Aside from the fourth largest bank, the rest of the institutions of
any signi¯cant size are subsidiaries of American, Canadian or Spanish
banks.
² Foreign banks operate as subsidiaries, which means that their liabilities
are limited to the capital of the company incorporated in Mexico and
that is the holder of the banking license.
² A recent change in the Banking Law gives the Ministry of Finance the
power to discretionarily authorize the operation of branches, whose lia-
bilities would be limited to the capital of the parent (holding) company.
However, the Executive branch has yet to exercise powers.
² Mexico's Currency Law assigns a legal tender status only to the peso.
Hence, a full integration of Mexico's payments system to that of the
other country ( i.e. equal status to both currencies) would require an
amendment of such law.
Before proceeding, it shall be pointed out that the characteristics of the
¯nancial sector that underlies our discussion are rather similar across most
of the Spanish speaking Latin American countries. In the speci¯c case of
Mexico, the commercial banks are only national banks, in the sense that
are subject exclusively to Federal regulations. They are a dozen in number,
and about 2
3 of the industry is concentrated in the top 4 institutions. The
Central Bank is autonomous and retains the power to regulate all banking
transactions involving any foreign currency. However, the prudential regula-
tion dealing with accounting practices and capital su±ciency is in the hands
of the Ministry of Finance.
4The literature
The relevance of the research in the area of capital controls comes from
the fact that, contrary to what happened in the past, they take more subtle
forms today. Notwithstanding, we believe that their impact may still be
substantial.
The recent research on this topic may be limited by the fact that, in
practice, the implementation of these sort of capital controls has a lot to do
with the way in which banks and other ¯nancial intermediaries are regulated
in their every day operations. To the extent that such rules tend to be
complex and rather obscure, their presence and implications are less obvious
to the eyes of the analysts. This happens in spite of the fact that aside from
the Mexican case, there are some other similar and interesting examples
of forex market segmentation in countries such as Argentina, Chile, South
Korea and Colombia, documented by and Abrams and Beato [1].
In this paper, we suggest that the so called ¯rst and second generation
models of exchange rate collapses could o®er a good technical framework
for answering policy questions dealing when deciding on how to regulate the
forex market.
On the one hand, the early models by Salant and Henderson [18], Krug-
man [11] and Flood and Garber [9] capture in a simple mathematical formu-
lation the fact that individual agents take into account their own projections
on how the stock of reserves will evolve when deciding whether or not hold
the local currency at the existing price. The second generation models, like
the ones surveyed in Flood and Marion [10], add three elements that will be
useful in understanding the defensive policy responses like the ones that we
have described for the Mexican case;
² First, authorities generally pose non-linear policy responses to attacks.
Although the literature focuses on ¯scal and monetary reaction func-
tions, like in Calvo [5] and Obstfeld [15], it does not rule out the non-
linear regulatory caps like the ones typically present in the practice of
banking regulation.
² Second, it is not unusual to ¯nd multiple equilibria solutions, due to
information costs like in Morris and Slim [12], or to policy responses
as suggested by Obstfeld [14]. In our case, we will ¯nd the possibility
of multiple equilibria coming from the stochastic speci¯cation of the
model, not very di®erently from the one suggested in Obstfeld [15].
5² Finally, agents are not necessarily homogeneous which raises a variety
of issues on how they assimilate each other's beliefs and actions, like in
Calvo [4]. In our case, the general public, the commercial banks and the
international ¯nancial markets represent agents who face constraints
that are di®erent for reasons ranging from their own preferences to the
institutional environment where they operate.
This paper also build upon some of the notions presented by Chinn and
Dooley [7], Gultekin et.al. [13] and Dornbusch and Reynoso [8] in the context
of the ¯nancial repression literature. These papers stress the fact that it is
not always true that taking steps in the direction of ¯nancial liberalization is
the best course of action. In fact, a selective and discretionary liberalization
of some segments of the market could end up increasing the vulnerability of
this sector to real and nominal shocks.
This paper
The speci¯c scope of this paper to show some simulation results from
a model that tries captures on the one hand, the implications of not using
international reserves exclusively for defending a peg; and on the other hand,
the e®ects of various restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, like the
ones used by Mexico, on some key nominal variables such as interest rates,
country risk spreads and the exchange rate.
To that end, the ¯rst section explains the speci¯cation of the model.
Section two parameterizes the model with values that may be reasonably
found in a small open economy. Section three ranks the results in terms of
some stabilization policy criteria.
Finally, the simulations are run on MATLAB-Simulinkr in order to
allow the reader to carry out her own simulations, if she decides to do so, on
a widely used open platform. All the relevant code is included in the paper.
In addition, a MATLAB GUI is available from the author on request.
1 The Model
The setting has two currencies. The local currency will be generically
referred as pesos, and the foreign currency will be the dollar. The exchange
rate will be expressed in terms of dollars per peso. All variables will be nom-
6inal. The general price level at home and abroad will be assumed constant
and set equal to one.
To simplify things we will consider a Krugman-Flood-Garber economy
with the following exchange rate determination equation:
e = min(R=W;etarget) (1)
where W stands for nominal wealth of the public, denominated in pesos;
R is some de¯nition of the stock of international reserves and is denomi-
nated in dollars; and etarget is the target exchange rate set arbitrarily by the
authorities.
1.1 The agents
The model has four agents with the following constraints and behavioral
characteristics:
Central Bank. We will work with a simpli¯ed balance sheet of the central
bank. On the asset side, we will see the net loans in pesos, Lp, plus the
loans in dollars Ld=e to commercial banks. To this amount we will add the
international reserves R=e. It will be assumed that that there is a reserve
requirement imposed on commercial banks equivalent to 100% of the peso
deposits and that individuals hold pesos only in the form of deposits. In this
economy there is no currency in circulation and therefore, B in equation ( 2)
stands for the monetary base.
Lp + Ld=e + R=e ´ B (2)
We will assume that at any given time there is an exogenously determined
supply of dollars available to the central bank, the commercial banks and
the public. Such supply is governed by a stationary process in equation (3)
which can be also seen as some sort of balance of payments equation,
R
s = m + sz (3)
with zj » N(0,1), for all j, and cov(zi;zj) = 0 for i 6= j. The small s is
the standard deviation of the process ( 3), and the subscripts (i;j) can be
thought as indices for independent observations.
The supply Rs is distributed across agents according to equation (4),
7R
s = R + Dd + Ld (4)
where Dd are the dollars in the hands of the public. Implicit in this de¯ni-
tion is the notion that all current account surpluses are transferred somehow
¯rst to the central bank, either by interventions in the forex market or by
some ¯scal channel 3. The redistribution back to the private sector happens
through direct interventions to defend the parity, via the accommodation of





























Figure 1: Simulink representation of the central bank subsystem
Figure 1 is the Simulink representation of equations (1) to (4). It only
adds to what we have already said the remark that the central bank will also
passively attend to the needs of the commercial banks in pesos.
Commercial Banks. In the most general model, we will assume that
banks carry two books. One in dollars and another one in pesos. To keep
3This type of speci¯cation, where reserves °uctuate without an explicit intervention
of the central bank in the foreign exchange market is not that far away from reality in
the case of Mexico. There the central bank holds the foreign exchange accounts of the
Federal Government. For instance, the national oil company, PEMEX has to surrender all
its export revenues to the central bank; simultaneously the federal government is credited
with those proceeds in its peso account with Banco de Mexico.
8things simple, equation( 5) implies that, with respect to their operations in
pesos, the local banks only play the role of taking deposits and placing them
in their respective accounts at the central bank. Kp is the capital in the
peso book, denominated in pesos. Dp are the deposits that the public has in
pesos, and ¡Lc






















Figure 2: Simulink representation of the commercial banks' subsystem.
Kp + Dp = ¡Lp (5)
Kd + L
f
d ¡ Pd ¡ Ad = ¡Ld (6)
Figure 4 also displays the dollar book corresponding to equation (6).
The variable Pd is the dollar denominated loan portfolio. The variable Ad
represents some dollar denominated liquid assets held by the commercial
banks as sight deposits in foreign institutions, or in their dollar accounts at
the central bank. 4
Finally, equations (7) to (9) imply that the peso component of the capital
is modi¯ed by random and independent shocks, and that banks will keep
whatever long dollar position they may have in the form of liquid assets Ad.
4See Reynoso ([17]) for a description of the dollar reserve requirements that Banco de
Mexico imposes on local commercial banks.
9Kp = mp + sp» (7)
Kd = Kd (8)
Ad = A (9)
with »j » N(0,1), for all j, and cov(»i;»j) = 0 for i 6= j. Again, (i;j) are
indices for labelling the independent observations. We will also assume that
cov(»i;zj) = 0 for all i and j.
The Public. The setting is one of risk neutral individuals who make port-
folio allocation decisions on a given wealth, W ( constant in peso terms), as
shown in equation (10). Dd stands for the amount of dollars that people




p + Dd=e = W (10)
In deciding whether to hold pesos or dollars, these agents have to deter-
mine an expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate, E(°jR¡1¤) , and
then compare it with a measure of their opportunity cost. R¤ will be some
measure of the international reserves as de¯ned by equation (21), below.
To explain how we think that this process takes place, lets look ¯rst at
the expectation formation mechanism, and then we will come back to the
discussion on what the relevant opportunity cost should be.
The starting point is the calculation of the expected value of the two sides
of equation (1). Equations (11) to (14) do so by using the fact that shocks to
reserves are normally, independently and identically distributed. They also








































































Figure 3: Simulink representation for the expectation formation module
² The model is constructed having in mind a solution where people hold
peso deposits as default. Later on we will explain how the parameters
of the model can be set to have the situation where the economy is
dollarized.
² The variable R¤, or adjusted reserves, is the level of reserves that people
think that the central bank will hold once the foreign banks have made
their decision on how much they will lend to domestic banks. It follows
from equations (2) and (4), that the level of reserves could go down if
banks see their foreign funding stopped. We will develop an expression
for R¤ further down.
² We introduce the parameter · here, and in the opportunity cost section
of the model. Its purpose is to capture the possibility hysterisis or
irreversibility of capital °ight. The situation in mind is that since
individuals do not have the possibility to establish dollar denominated
deposits at home, they can either buy dollars and place them 'under
the mattress', or take them abroad. In practice, the latter is often an
irreversible phenomenon with some clandestine overtones, often for tax
reasons. Namely, if individuals decide to bring back their °own capital,
they are supposed to declare and pay taxes on the accrued and realized
interest and exchange gains. Frequently this is a substantial transaction
cost which only makes possible the repatriation either, when there is
11the perspective of a large exchange rate appreciation and/or when the
government declares a tax amnesty.
We decided to model this problem as one of a mandatory stay, that is,
if the public takes money out of the domestic system, they would have
to keep such dollars abroad for
p
(kappa) periods. For that reason, the
relevant exchange rate forecast is not the one step-ahead, but the · step
ahead projection. Finally, since we have assumed a stationary, normal
and separable shock process for the supply of dollars adjustment on the
conditional expectation formula amounts to simply scaling up · times
the standard deviation s.
Figure (3) is the Simulink representation of what was said above. It is
important to mention that the block named "S-Function: adjusted expecta-
tions" calls back the MATLAB subroutine in the appendix B which repli-
cates equations (11) to (14).
Once individuals have made the calculations of the return in dollars of
holding pesos implicit in equation (14), we assume that they compare it with
the interest rate on peso denominated assets.
Dp =
½
W if [(1 + i)·] + E(°jR¤
























Figure 4: Simulink representation of the subsystem for the general public
12Foreign lenders Foreign banks play the role of funding the dollar lending
portfolio of local banks. The basic assumption is that foreign banks will lend
as long as they think that local banks are solvent. Lets de¯ne K¤ in equation
(17) as the level of capital below which the foreign banks consider that they
would not be able to collect their principal and interest. We can also de¯ne
the default probability ¦ in equation (19) which will depend on the dollar
value of the total capital (eKp and Kd) of the local banks.





























Finally, the decision of how much to lend is given by equation (20) where
the foreign banks adjust their rate of return if, by the chances of not been
paid ¦, either because the capital dries up for reasons like bad loans, or





Pd if if ¡ ¦(^ e;Kd;Kp) ¸ 0
0 otherwise (20)
Equation(20) also allows us to write down the following de¯nition for R¤:
R
¤ = R
s ¡ Pd + L
f
d (21)
Figure (5) is the Simulink representation equations (16) to (21). The
block named "S-Function: default probability" calls back the MATLAB sub-
routine in the appendix C which replicates the subset of equations (16) to
(19).
Putting the subsystems together The Simulink implementation of the
complete model is done by simply interconnecting the subsystems in ¯gures










































Figure 5: Simulink representation of the subsystem for the foreign banks
The parameter editor block lists all the exogenous variables, but one. The
remaining one is the domestic interest rate i, which will be set in the way
described in section 1.2. Finally, the rectangular output blocks correspond
to the endogenous variables whose performance will be followed to rank the
various institutional arrangements in section 2 .
1.2 Parameterizing the degree of currency substitu-
tion
Is there any di®erence between dollarization and no-dollarization?
Instead of splitting the scenarios by means of comparing regime with a ¯xed
versus a °exible exchange rate; we have decided to look at the dichotomy be-
tween a dollarized economy, and another one where people hold peso deposits
Dp > 0, both with the same target exchange rate.
Our model implies that, inside some interval, interest rates could move
to exactly compensate the expected rate of depreciation, conditional on the
current exchange rate being equal to some target value etarget. In practice,
this exchange rate could be thought as a level consistent with some in°ation
objectives. In the absence of interventions in the forex market, it is per-
fectly possible to see a rather stable exchange rate accompanied by relatively
volatile interest rates. 5.
As long as the authorities (and/or the economy as a whole) can sustain in-
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5terest rates at levels below some stress rate imax, given the level of reserves R
and nominal wealth W, everybody will have their wealth in pesos. However,
given the speci¯cation of this model, the expected exchange rate is always
below the etarget level. Therefore, if interest rates are low enough, everybody
will run into dollars even if an actual devaluation is a rare phenomenon.
Lets see why this is true by looking at the domestic interest rate. In a
regime where people keep their peso deposits, the authorities are supposed
to have a feasible imax consistent with a sustainable etarget. Most of the time,
however, the market rate will be lower , as shown by equation ( 22)
(i + i






¡1 stands for R¤
¡1 in the case of no dollarization.
In the dollarized economy that is, where Dp = 0 or Dd = eW, the imax
rate can be set to arbitrarily low levels. The observed interest rates will now
be de¯ned by equation (23).





Since Dd does not enter in the de¯nition of R¤ in equation (21), it has to
be the case that Rd = Rnd, which means that the interest rate in both cases
can take the same values.
How imax is determined The simulations in section 2 will be done for
the no dollarization case. This will allow us to gather some additional in-
formation on the implications of the alternative imax distinguish two the c
In the other case, it will be endogenously determined by the Value at risk






max) · ® (24)
1.3 Parameterizing the regulatory regime
Based on the Mexican experience as described in table 1, we will simulate
¯ve regulatory cases.
16Case 1. Segmented banking activities but not general capital con-
trols. This will be the situation where :
² Commercial banks are not allowed to carry out any transaction in dol-
lars. Therefore, they only have a peso book and the corresponding
capital in pesos: Kd = L
f
d = Pd = 0.
² Individuals can freely convert their pesos into dollars and take them in
and out of the country at no penalty: · = 1.
Case 2. Segmented banking and general capital controls.
² Commercial banks are not allowed to carry out any transaction in dol-
lars. Therefore, they only have the peso book and capital in pesos:
Kd = L
f
d = Pd = 0.
² Individuals see their capital °ight as an irreversible phenomenon for
the reasons delineated in section 1.1. Thus, it is assumed that the
individual agents can get their dollars and take them out of the country
but, by doing so, they would be trespassing some administrative and/or
tax rules: · > 1.
Case 3. Banks can lend in dollars and borrow abroad but they
have to have matched positions. There are not capital controls.
² Commercial banks can have a lending portfolio in dollars, Pd > 0, but
face two restrictions. On the one hand, their liabilities in dollars have
to be matched by assets in the same amount, Kd = 0; and they are




² Since we do not assume capital controls, · = 1 .
Case 4. Banks can have long positions in dollars. There are not
capital controls.
² Commercial banks are not allowed to take deposits in dollars, but
they can have long dollar positions. In other words, they are al-
lowed (required) to have a dollar book with its own capital, addi-
tional to the general capital requirements. The assumption will be that
17such long dollar component will be held in the form of liquid assets:
A = Kd = Kd > 0.
² The dollar loan portfolio is funded with resources coming from overseas
loans, Pd = L
f
d.
² In this case · = 1, since no general capital controls are assumed.
Case 5. Full integration: local banks are branches of foreign banks
Because we are assuming a small economy, replacing the local banks with
branches of large foreign banks, is equivalent to assuming arbitrarily large
values for Kd=Pd. In this sense, case 5 is a limiting example of case 4.
Furthermore, given the structure of the model in section 1, the simulation
outcomes for variables such as the exchange rate, the domestic interest rates
and the country risk premium must be the same as those in case 1. The
reason is that by having the foreign parent banks to take care of the funding
of the dollar denominated operations, the central bank is insulated from
any contingency deriving from the sudden erosion of the commercial banks
capital or from abrupt funding stoppages.
Of course there will be variables that will behave di®erently in cases 1 and
5, such as the loan portfolio in dollars and the dynamics of the net position
of the commercial banks vis µ avis the central bank.
Therefore, since case 5 would be redundant with others, it is not explicitly
simulated in section 2. Notwithstanding, the reader should be able to see the
implications of this construct through the inspection of the simulation results
for cases 1 and 4.
2 Simulations
2.1 Simulation parameters
Since the simulations are carried out assuming no dollarization,imax is
obtained endogenously.
The model of ¯gure 1 is simulated 50 times for di®erent values of imax,
starting from those given in table 2 in column imax
0 . In each simulation
round values of imax are increased in steps of 0:05 until one is able to obtain
a sample where the exchange rate is equal to the target etarget in all but two
18observations; that is, 96% of the time. This corresponds to a value for the
parameter ® = 0:04.
Case m s2 etarget W · Pd if mp s2
p Kd imax
0
1 11.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.30 0.00 0.10
2 11.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 2.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.30 0.00 0.00
3:a 11.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 3.00 0.10 2.00 0.30 0.00 0.35
3:b 11.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 3.00 0.10 4.00 0.30 0.00 0.30
3:c 11.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 3.00 0.10 5.00 0.30 0.00 0.05
4:a 11.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 3.00 0.10 1.00 0.30 1.00 0.30
4:b 11.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 3.00 0.10 1.00 0.30 3.00 0.30
4:c 11.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.00 3.00 0.10 1.00 0.30 4.00 0.05
Table 2: Simulation Parameters
The parameters of 2 imply an economy where the level of available re-
serves is larger than etargetW but smaller than etargetW + Pd. This implies
that for a devaluation to actually take place it would be necessary to have
both, the foreign banks and the public running against the central bank, and
values of imax beyond what is sustainable.
The scenarios of table 2 aim at capturing three aspects of the problem:
² The impact per se of various regulatory constructs.
² The performance of such regulatory settings under di®erent degrees of
volatility in the balance of payment shocks. To that end, the variable
s is let to go from 1 to 3.
² The extent to which the response of the economy to external shocks
varies when the banking sector is more or less capitalized. To see that,
we are assuming a banking sector whose capital runs from frac110 to
frac12 of the economy. The dollar portfolio, for the cases where it is
non-zero, amounts to 30% of the peso liabilities of the banking system,
whereas the volatility of capital in the banking sector is set to 0:3 in
all scenarios.
Finally, as for the MATLAB and Simulink simulation parameters, the
solver options are set to ¯xed-step for the ODE5 Dormand Price algorithm.
192.2 How the output is organized
The tables in the appendices summarize the outcome of 1;200 simulations,
resulting from 50 simulations per round times (4 regulatory scenarios + 4
additional scenarios for di®erent values of Kd and mp ) , times 3 scenarios
corresponding to di®erent values of s. The tables in the appendix A and
report the mean and variances of each round of 500 simulations.
2.3 The results
² Generalized capital controls (Case 2) and a requirement of large long
dollar positions imposed on banks (case 4:c), display the best perfor-
mance with respect to imax, the level of expected exchange rate ^ e and
the volatility of the expected exchange rate, d var(^ e) for all values of
s(Tables 3, 4 and 5).
² When the volatility of the balance of payments shocks is low; s = 1,
cases 1 (market segmentation without controls); 2 (generalized con-
trols); 3:c (banks well capitalized in pesos) and 4:c (banks well capi-
talized in dollars) do equally well. However, when such volatility in-
creases, the most e®ective shield is given by capital controls, if we look
at imax as benchmark. If we also look for high values of ^ e and low
numbers for d var(^ e), case 4:c remains a very strong option.
² With respect to ^ e, tables 4 and 5 show that case 3:c under-performs
cases 1;2 and 4:c when the volatility of the balance of payments, s, in-
creases. The reader shall read tables 4 and 5 knowing that the expected
exchange rate for case 2 re°ects the ·-step ahead forecast. Therefore,
when the adjustment is made to make it comparable to the rest of the
scenarios, case 2 fares very well.
² If banks are moderately capitalized (cases 3:b and 4:b), they do as bad as
when they are poorly capitalized (cases 3:a: and 3:b). This suggests that
there may be a discontinuity that, unless properly addressed, makes the
scenario of ¯nancial repression superior to the more deregulated ones.
² The numbers in table 6 correspond to what would be the lower bound
for the domestic interest rate, imin, once the sign is changed. The results
once again con¯rm what the lowest rates are achieved in cases where
20segmentation is more extreme or where the liberalization of banking
transactions is accompanied by their adequate capitalization.
² Table 12 suggest that foreign banks may be make a more sharp dis-
tinction across well capitalized banks depending on whether they are
capitalized in pesos or dollars, due to di®erences in probability, ¦. For
low values of s, scenarios 3:c and 4:c do not display signi¯cant di®er-
ences. However, this is not longer the result for larger values of s.
² Cases 3:a to 3:c may have an impact on our de¯nition of Base Money.
When banks capitalize in pesos in our money, and they deposit them
in the central bank, they are actually performing the role of picking
up liquidity from the markets, which has a contractionary bias. This
contrasts with what happens when banks capitalize in dollars, because
such dollars go to the reserves achieving the corresponding sterilization
e®ect. There are obviously ways in which the central bank could com-
pensate the impacts of the former case, however it will end up having
a net debtor position with the commercial banks, which has proven to
have, in practice, consequences in the way monetary policy is carried
out. 6
Conclusions
The banking sector plays a very important role in the transmission mech-
anism of shocks that a®ect the exchange rate and interest rates in a small
open economy.
When banks are weak, their own speci¯c shocks are added to the bal-
ance of payments shocks, unless there is some degree of negative correlation
between them. This means that ¯nancial liberalization, when banks lack
enough capital to cushion their own risk, may add to the vulnerability of the
economy as a whole.
This paper shows that the segmentation of the foreign exchange market
may be a good policy response when, either the banks or the central bank do
not have enough resources to withstand unforseen shocks. However, it also
suggests that if such resources are available, there is no reason to keep such
market segmented.
6See Carstens and Gil Diaz [6] for an explanation on how this happened in the Mexican
case
21Further understanding of this topic will bene¯t from the analysis of the
recent evidence on the relationship between exchange controls and bank sol-
vency and macroeconomic performance of small economies, specially in times
of signi¯cant uncertainty.
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23A Simulation results for the no-dollarization
scenario
Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.1500 0.2500 0.4000
2 0.1000 0.1500 0.2500
3:a 0.4000 0.5000 0.6500
3:b 0.3500 0.5000 0.6500
3:c 0.1000 0.3000 0.6000
4:a 0.3500 0.5000 0.6500
4:b 0.3500 0.5000 0.6500
4:c 0.1000 0.2500 0.4000
Table 3: Stress interest rate levels: imax
Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.9812 0.9345 0.8836
2 0.9537 0.8713 0.7860
3:a 0.8017 0.7708 0.7265
3:b 0.8630 0.8066 0.7533
3:c 0.9812 0.9303 0.8573
4:a 0.8017 0.7708 0.7265
4:b 0.9373 0.8904 0.8372
4:c 0.9783 0.9322 0.8815
Table 4: Expected exchange rate: ^ e = E(ejR¤
¡1)
24Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.0010 0.0073 0.0198
2 0.0013 0.0076 0.0194
3:a 0.0089 0.0247 0.0460
3:b 0.0172 0.0322 0.0538
3:c 0.0010 0.0082 0.0260
4:a 0.0089 0.0247 0.0460
4:b 0.0162 0.0318 0.0529
4:c 0.0013 0.0074 0.0197
Table 5: Variance of the simulated expected exchange rate: d var(^ e)
Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 -0.0188 -0.0655 -0.1164
2 -0.0463 -0.1287 -0.2140
3:a -0.1983 -0.2292 -0.2735
3:b -0.1370 -0.1934 -0.2467
3:c -0.0188 -0.0697 -0.1427
4:a -0.1983 -0.2292 -0.2735
4:b -0.0627 -0.1096 -0.1628
4:c -0.0217 -0.0678 -0.1185
Table 6: Expected rate of depreciation ^ r = E(°jR¤
¡1)
Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.0010 0.0073 0.0198
2 0.0013 0.0076 0.0194
3:a 0.0089 0.0247 0.0460
3:b 0.0172 0.0322 0.0538
3:c 0.0010 0.0082 0.0260
4:a 0.0089 0.0247 0.0460
4:b 0.0162 0.0318 0.0529
4:c 0.0013 0.0074 0.0197
Table 7: Sample variance of the rate of depreciation: d var(^ r)
25Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 10.9943 10.5804 10.5746
2 10.9943 10.5804 10.5746
3:a 7.5861 7.5804 7.5746
3:b 8.7494 8.4987 8.3093
3:c 10.5861 10.4579 10.0236
4:a 8.5861 8.5804 8.5746
4:b 13.0351 13.0293 12.9624
4:c 14.3820 14.5804 14.5746
Table 8: Average Level of International Reserves: R + Ad
Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.9269 8.8380 14.0394
2 0.9269 8.8380 14.0394
3:a 5.4904 8.8380 14.0394
3:b 9.6071 13.9016 19.0676
3:c 5.4904 11.9358 17.7170
4:a 5.4904 8.8380 14.0394
4:b 10.4401 15.3190 21.9727
4:c 7.3275 8.8380 14.0394
Table 9: Sample variance of International Reserves: d var(R + Ad)
Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.0843 0.7737 1.1206
2 0.0843 0.7737 1.1206
3:a 1.5862 2.0471 3.8085
3:b -1.2665 -0.3876 1.5350
3:c -3.5224 -3.6126 -2.8233
4:a 1.1205 1.6553 2.4358
4:b 0.4776 0.7169 0.9622
4:c 0.0307 -0.0609 -0.1940
Table 10: Monetary Base: R + Ld + Lp
26Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.2832 4.2755 5.4551
2 0.2832 4.2755 5.4551
3:a 1.7622 3.0671 55.8468
3:b 3.1110 4.2958 57.6424
3:c 3.5792 1.4518 3.7653
4:a 1.5355 1.3602 4.7967
4:b 3.5792 4.4839 6.2421
4:c 0.4908 3.1061 10.1478
Table 11: Variance of the sample Base: d var(R + Ld + Lp)
Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104
2 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104
3:a 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
3:b 0.4117 0.4903 0.5403
3:c 0.0001 0.0415 0.1309
4:a 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
4:b 0.0619 0.0878 0.1167
4:c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 12: Probability of default: ¦
Case s = 1 s = 2 s = 3
1 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
2 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
3:a 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3:b 0.1641 0.1856 0.1857
3:c 0.0000 0.0359 0.0955
4:a 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4:b 0.0148 0.0317 0.0590
4:c 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 13: Sample variance of the probability of default: d var(¦)
27B Code for the S-Function block: adjusted
expectations






case f 1, 2, 4, 9 g
sys=[];
otherwise
error(['Unhandled flag = ',num2str(flag)]);
end











ts = [-1 0];














29C Code for the S-Function block: adjusted
expectations





case f 1, 2, 4, 9 g
sys=[];
otherwise
error(['Unhandled flag = ',num2str(flag)]);
end











ts = [-1 0];
function sys = mdlOutputs(t,x,u)
syms c f=(1/(u(2).*sqrt(2.*pi))).
*exp((-1/(2.*u(2).^2)).*(c-u(1)).^2);
g=int(f,-Inf,u(3));
k=eval(g);
sys =k;
30